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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature argues that banks are able to provide more efficient debt-
related external monitoring for the corporate governance of firms because they have a 
comparative cost advantage in accessing superior inside information (Fama, 1985; Datta et 
al., 1999). But what happens if banks as creditors also hold equity in the same firm (dual 
holding)?  
Recent investigations have focused on this phenomenon and its financial implications for 
the corporate governance system, albeit with mixed results. Some studies from developed 
markets agree that dual holding can help to internalize the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and creditors and to obtain proprietary information about the firm due to dual 
holders’ involvement on both the debt and equity sides. Thus, these studies find that dual 
holding can benefit firms by promoting their access to bank capital and improving their 
performance (Kang et al., 2000; Mahrt-Smith, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010). Meanwhile, another 
strand of studies focuses on the harmful effects of dual holding, arguing that it leads to 
potentially more serious conflicts of interest (Diamond, 1984; Welch, 1997). Empirical 
evidence suggests that, although dual holdings allow firms in emerging markets to have better 
access to debt financing, banks do not monitor these firms quite so extensively, which  may 
result in poorer firm performance (Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011).  
The literature also documents that in emerging markets, where the banks are the main 
providers of capital and bank credit is scarce and highly regulated by the government (Cull 
and Xu, 2000), bank lending may increase the probability that borrowers will collude with 
bank managers. This in turn encourages borrowers to seek rents through bribing bank 
managers. However, the existing empirical results concerning the effect of corruption are 
mixed. Cai et al. (2011) find that bribing officials reduces firm performance, while Chen et 
al. (2013) argue that corruption can improve banks' lending decisions and aid private firms in 
China.  These studies provide no evidence for whether corruption prevents dual holders from 
playing a monitoring role, and thus from contributing to improved firm performance. 
In addition to the ambiguous findings from studies of the financial and economic 
implications of dual holding, there is no comprehensive analysis showing the mechanism 
through which dual holding works, especially in emerging markets. In this paper we attempt 
to address the interesting and unresolved question of the role that banks' dual holding has 
played, what are its related costs and benefits, and how it influences firm performance, given 
that corruption in the banking industry is prevalent in emerging markets.  
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To achieve a better understanding of the role of banks' dual holding in corporate 
performance in emerging markets, we first examine the effect of dual holding on firms' 
access to bank loans, and then explore the channel(s) through which dual holding affects firm 
performance by investigating its effect on banks' lending decisions and firms' investment 
efficiency. The existing literature finds that optimal bank lending reinforces firms’ 
investment efficiency, while politically based soft lending may bias firms’ behaviour with 
regard to investment decisions (Lang et al., 1996; Chen et al., 2011). Firms’ investment 
decisions thus significantly influence firm performance, because firm performance responds 
positively to better investment, and gains from investments enhance firm profitability (Fama 
and French, 1998; Chen et al., 2009). Since dual holding facilitates the flow of capital and 
promotes companies’ access to bank capital (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Lin et al., 2009), 
we expect dual holding will affect firm performance through its influence on banks' lending 
decisions and firms' investment policy. 
In developed countries, permitting banks to hold equity in non-financial companies can 
mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors that create incentives to 
deviate from optimal investment 1  (Kang et al., 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
Nevertheless, in emerging markets, where there is often strong government intervention and 
prevalent corruption in the banking sector, existing evidence suggests that banks are reluctant 
to be effective monitors (Barth et al., 2006), and state-owned banks are obliged to lend 
largely to SOEs to maintain normal economic growth and achieve social goals (Cull and Xu, 
2005; Allen et al., 2005). On the other hand, banks' dual holding may also lead to potential 
collusion between banks’ and borrowers’ managers, who often pursue empire-building and 
other private benefits. This collusion leads to connection-based soft lending decisions, which 
results in inefficient investment by borrowers and further destroys firm value. Therefore, it is 
the net effect of banks' dual holding, between the benefits of accessing bank loans and the 
costs of collusion, that will determine banks' lending and firms' investment decisions.  
While banks' dual holding of non-financial companies is not unique to China, the 
Chinese corporate and financial environment is particularly interesting for this research 
because China is the largest transition economy, and is characterized as having an absence of 
mature public bond markets. Indeed, corporate external finance relies mostly on bank 
borrowing, so banks play a very important role in determining the availability of credit. In 
                                                          
1 The asset-substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977), and 
the overinvestment problem (Stulz, 1990) are well-known examples of such distortions of investment policy. 
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addition, the Chinese financial system is dominated by the government through direct and 
indirect state ownership and control of most banks, while these banks' lending decisions often 
reflect government-dictated policies (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013).  In other words, 
state-owned banks dominate the Chinese financial system, and tend to allocate and price 
loans according to government preferences.  
Second, the co-existence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China 
provides another unique institutional environment in which to examine the effects of dual 
holding on banks’ lending decisions and borrowers’ investment efficiencies and, in turn, on 
the performance of firms with different ownership. From the banks’ perspective, because 
state-owned banks wish to  achieve multiple objectives,  including their political and 
economic goals, they tend to lend largely to SOEs and bail out poorly performing SOEs; thus  
they can largely ignore SOEs’ non-performing loans, a typical soft lending decision (Cull and 
Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2008). Moreover, SOEs have a multilayered principal-agent framework 
and inadequate ultimate property-rights protection, which may further increase the chance of 
collusion between managers of borrowers and banks when banks have dual holdings in SOEs, 
due to lack of sufficient monitoring by the state controlling shareholder. In contrast, banks are 
required to extend their discipline and monitoring to the non-SOEs they lend to (Santos and 
Rumble, 2006), and are eager to maximize their proceeds by advocating effective monitoring 
on firms’ investments. From the borrowers’ perspective, non-SOEs are similar to their 
counterparts in developed markets in that they have a simpler objective of value 
maximization (Chen et al., 2011), and thus the potential collusion between managers of firms 
and banks can be averted by the controlling shareholders. Therefore, the homogeneity of state 
ownership in both banks and SOEs and the heterogeneity of ownership structure between 
SOEs and non-SOEs make China an excellent context in which to examine the effect of 
banks' dual holding on their lending decisions and firms' investment policy across SOEs and 
non-SOEs. 
Furthermore, the unique Chinese institutional setting for banks' dual holding also allows 
us to further reduce concerns about an endogeneity issue. Although the Commercial Bank 
Law implemented in 1995 did not force banks to relinquish their existing ownership in listed 
non-financial firms, banks have not been allowed to invest any new equity in non-financial 
firms since then. Therefore, banks' dual holding during our sample period (2003 to 2010) was 
largely exogenously determined and less likely to be affected by firm characteristics and 
corporate governance variables. This is perhaps the most significant advantage of using 
Chinese data: it allows us to infer the nature of banks' dual holding when its formation 
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predates, by several years, the lending decisions and firm investment policies we wish to 
analyse. We argue that such a lag between the formation of banks' dual holding, their lending 
decisions and firms' investment policies removes concerns about reverse causality. 
Nevertheless, we will also apply alternative approaches to dealing with the potential 
endogeneity issue, including event-study methodology, natural experiment, and two-stage 
least square and fixed-effect regressions.  
From the empirical analysis we find that the change in the ratio of bank loan to total 
assets is higher when a borrower’s lender (a bank) is among the borrower’s top ten largest 
shareholders (dual holding). This effect is more pronounced in non-SOEs than SOEs. We 
also find that dual holding reinforces the exercise of using commercial judgments in 
allocating capital to non-SOEs, which is consistent with previous studies (Firth et al., 2009; 
Chen et al., 2013), while dual holding is more likely to distort banks' lending decisions and 
lead to capital misallocation to SOEs. We further find that dual holding is likely to enhance 
investment efficiency only in non-SOEs, whereas dual holding in SOEs relates to a less 
efficient investment. Our results also suggest that for non-SOEs, shareholders with more 
highly concentrated ownership, or family and foreign controlling shareholders are more able 
to exert effective monitoring on the collusion between the managers of firms and banks, 
which leads to optimal lending decisions and more efficient investment than for other non-
SOEs.  
Our findings also confirm that dual holding is less likely to add value for SOEs, which is 
consistent with the evidence from other emerging markets (Fok et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2009), 
while dual holding is more likely to increase value for non-SOEs, which is similar to what 
occurs in developed markets. Our investigation complements the notion that dual holding can 
be a double-edged sword in emerging markets. We argue that whether a bank plays a 
monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on 
whether the potential collusion between managers of firms and banks can be averted, which 
in turn is determined by the governance framework and firms’ ownership structure. Our main 
findings are robust to corrections for the endogeneity of dual holding, including using single 
bank loan contracts, event studies of loan contracts and mergers and acquisitions 
announcements, natural experiments regarding the release of an economic stimulus package, 
and two-stage least square and fixed-effect regressions.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the relationship 
between banks and firms through dual holding, and its consequences for firm performance 
and valuation, has recently evolved, but with mixed evidence. Our research adds new 
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evidence to the literature concerning the effect of dual holding in emerging markets. Existing 
studies focus more on matured markets2; little is known about how dual holding works to 
affect firm performance and its effect in emerging markets. We propose that bank lending 
and firm investment are the channels through which dual holding can affect firm 
performance, so we argue that whether dual holding can increase firm value depends heavily 
on how effectively banks' lending decisions and firms' investment decisions are monitored. 
Existing literature documents that how banks monitor a borrower depends on the severity of 
the agency problems between creditors and borrowers (Harvey et al., 2004); our evidence 
adds new insight by suggesting that in emerging markets where property rights are not clearly 
defined, the degree to which banks play their monitoring role through directly holding firms’ 
equity depends on the severity of the agency problems between managers and shareholders of 
borrowing firms.  
Second, an evolving literature relating to dual holding has recently begun to focus on 
China (Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011). Lin et al. (2009) find that bank ownership increases 
the tendency for companies to bank capital access, but reduces operating performance 
because the monitoring of the firms’ investment is compromised; Luo et al. (2011) examine 
the way bank ownership affects firm performance through corporate executive perquisites 
(perks). In a departure from these papers, the current study provides direct evidence of the 
effect of dual holding on banks' lending decisions and firms' investment policies. We argue 
that an optimal lending decision leads to investment efficiency for borrowers, and the effect 
of dual holding is determined by firms' ownership structure. Moreover, unlike prior studies, 
which use a pooled sample of all listed firms with only a dummy to control for the effect of 
SOEs, this study completely disentangles the effect of dual holdings between SOEs and non-
SOEs by considering them independently. Our study provides fresh evidence that dual 
holding is likely to enhance banks' lending decisions and firms' investment efficiency only in 
non-SOEs, while the opposite holds for SOEs. On that basis, this study provides much more 
robust and comprehensive evidence for the effect of dual holding on firm performance in an 
emerging market, particularly in an environment where state ownership dominates the 
financial system.  
Third, we complement a growing literature relating to the bank-firm relationship that 
suggests a few proxies for this relationship, such as relationship banking (Boot, 2000; 
                                                          
2 Most of these studies are from Germany and Japan. Because U.S. regulations prevent banks from holding an 
equity position in non-financial firms, Jiang et al. (2010) investigate the role of non-commercial banking 
institutions as dual holders. 
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Bharath et al., 2011), pre-existing borrower-lender personal relationship (Engelberg et al., 
2012), holding bank ownership (Berger et al., 2009) and the appointment of bankers onto the 
board (Krosnzer and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005). This study, however, extends 
our understanding of banks’ impact on firms’ corporate decisions from a more direct 
perspective: banks' dual holding of listed companies. We document that the degree to which 
banks play their monitoring role through directly holding firms’ equity depends on the 
severity of the agency problems between managers and shareholders of borrowing firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the evolution of 
banks' dual holding and the economic stimulus package exercised in China, and develops our 
main hypotheses; Section 3 describes the data and methodology; Section 4 reports our 
empirical evidence; and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development  
2.1 Banks' dual holding in China 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Chinese government launched a reform of its banking 
industry3. In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the 
Big Four), which took control of all the commercial banking functions of the People’s Bank 
of China (the Central Bank). In 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks 4  were 
established and took over the policy-lending functions from the Big Four, and it was from 
that time that joint stock commercial banks and city banks began to emerge in China. 
Because China lacked a public bond market and relied heavily on bank borrowing, during the 
early 1990s these banks were the only type of financial institutions in the market, and  thus 
were actively involved in providing capital for corporate sector growth, but under supervision 
from the People’s Bank of China.  
 In the early 1990s, two stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 
and subsequently many SOEs undertook reform to become listed on one or the other. 
According to the regulations of the Central Bank, commercial banks were encouraged to 
participate in the sponsorship and underwriting business of initial public offerings (IPOs) of 
listed SOEs (Cao, 2008), to become initial shareholders of these IPO firms. In this sense 
banks' dual holdings were formed before these listed firms began to trade publicly. In 1995 
the Commercial Bank Law (revised in 2003) clearly prohibited commercial banks from 
holding new ownership in non-financial companies without permission from the authorities.  
                                                          
3 During this period, China also initiated economic reform aimed at transforming its economy from planned to 
market-oriented. 
4 These are the State Development Banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export and 
Import Bank of China.  
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The law not only prohibited banks from holding equity in listed firms, it also prevented 
commercial banks from becoming shareholders of listed firms through other channels, such 
as becoming the legal personal shareholders of firms that defaulted on their loans, or through 
a debt-for-equity swap. Although banks can no longer become shareholders of listed 
companies through direct investment, it is worth noting that they can still exert an active 
influence through their existing dual holding of the companies (Luo et al., 2011). 
2.2 Economic stimulus package 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007, developing countries have directly injected 
money into state-controlled banks to stimulate economic growth, which has resulted in a 
significant credit growth since 2008 in large emerging markets like India, China, Turkey, and 
Brazil (Onaran, 2013). In China, between the end of 2008 and 2010, 4 trillion RMB (about 
$586 billion), which accounted for 12.5% of total GDP in 2008, was injected into public 
projects. Following the application of several instruments to boost bank-loan supply, it 
substantially increased between the fourth quarter in 2008 and the fourth quarter in 2010, due 
to the stimulus program (Shen et al., 2014).   
The government’s intention to increase its funding to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises from bank loans was manifested in the People’s Bank of China’s stated monetary 
policy “to guide financial institutions to increase credit lending to agriculture, rural areas and 
farmers, small- and medium-sized enterprises”. However, as argued by Shen et al. (2014), 
small and private firms are still limited in their access to bank lending because of information 
asymmetry, while state-owned banks would choose more reliable companies as clients. They 
found that the expanded availability of bank loans during 2009 and 2010 does not increase 
corporate leverage in small and private firms as much as in large and state-owned firms. The 
question we address is the effect of the implementation of the economic stimulus package on 
banks' lending decisions and firms' investment efficiency across SOEs and non-SOEs. This 
natural experiment provides us with an opportunity to test whether SOEs with banks as dual 
holders are more sensitive to the exogenous shocks of bank loan supply than those without 
dual holders, which results in loan decisions being less optimal in these SOEs; and whether 
the situation in non-SOEs is the exact opposite. These induced loan incentive changes should 
lead to changes in firms’ investment behaviour and efficiency. We therefore use the dummy 
Stimulus for the period between 2009 and 2010 to measure the exogenous shock of bank loan 
supply.  Findings about the effect of the stimulus package's implementation will provide us 
with evidence on how government intervention affects lending decisions and firms' 
investment policies, which will enable us to add new evidence to the literature. 
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2.3 Hypothesis development 
Our first hypothesis relates to the fundamental effect of dual holding with regard to 
firms’ access to bank loans, especially the potential difference between SOEs and non-SOEs. 
In principle, the conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between shareholders and 
creditors could be mitigated when banks are also the shareholders of the same firms 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001); the mitigation of these conflicts could lead to easier access to 
bank loans (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Barth et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009) and lower cost of 
loans (Jiang et al., 2010). China is identified as having an underdeveloped financial system 
and lacking a public bond market; banks are the main providers of capital, while bank credit 
is scarce (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et al., 2008). In addition, more than 90% of the banking 
assets in China are owned and controlled by the government, the financial system is 
dominated by government ownership, and most firm borrowings are supported by bank loans 
(Firth et al., 2012). Because of this government domination and the policy factors and 
homogeneity of state ownership, state-owned banks are more likely to grant credit to SOEs 
than to non-SOEs, following the objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats, to serve both 
political and economic goals (Firth et al., 2009). As a consequence, non-SOEs face more 
severe conflicts of interest between creditors and borrowers, as well as more asymmetric 
information than their SOE counterparts, because non-SOEs have no implicit government 
guarantee and have shorter bank-borrower relationships than SOEs (Firth et al., 2009). Thus, 
we expect that the effects of dual holding on reducing conflicts of interest and information 
asymmetry, and in turn promoting firms to access bank loans, will be more pronounced in 
non-SOEs than SOEs. Furthermore, the reduction in conflicts of interest and asymmetric 
information leads to lower monitoring costs, which in turn encourages banks to grant more 
long-term loans (Guedes and Opler, 1996); thus we also expect that dual holding may lead to 
more long-term bank loans, a situation that is more pronounced in non-SOEs. Therefore, we 
construct our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Dual holding leads to firms having better access to (long-term) bank loans, which is 
more pronounced for non-SOEs than SOEs. 
Our next hypothesis relates to the effects of banks' dual holding on banks' lending 
decisions and firms' investment decisions. As discussed above, banks' dual holding may lead 
to potential collusion between banks’ and borrowers’ managers, who pursue empire-building 
and other private benefits.  This collusion tends to distort bank lending decisions, which 
results in inefficient investment decisions by borrowers and further destroys firm value. 
Therefore, it is the net effect of banks' dual holding, between the marginal benefits of 
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accessing more bank loans and the marginal costs of collusion, that determines banks' lending 
decisions and firms' investment decisions.  
SOEs' banking relationship has already been established because both banks and firms 
are owned by the state. If banks have now become shareholders of SOEs, banks' dual holding 
does not provide additional benefits in terms of accessing bank loans. Nevertheless, it does 
indicate a better and more stable bank-firm relationship, and these SOEs are now more 
favoured by state-owned banks. This may eventually lead to a more inefficient allocation of 
capital because these SOEs are more likely to get bank loans regardless of their profitability 
and creditworthiness (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). On the other hand, SOEs have a specific 
corporate governance model with a multilayered principal-agent framework and an unclear 
clarification of ultimate property rights. Central and local government officials serving as 
principals hold the control rights in the name of the state without any residual claim rights. 
Thus, no one in the principal-agent relationship chain has any incentive to maximise profits 
for the ultimate real principal, while they may have a strong incentive to pursue their own 
benefits without being adequately monitored by controlling shareholders. This creates the 
potential for collusion between banks’ and firms’ managers, along with more severe agency 
problems in SOEs. As a result, banks' dual holding would suggest a more severe soft lending 
decision in these SOEs.  
Soft lending then encourages SOEs with dual holding to invest more into building their 
empires, regardless of whether they have good investment opportunities; this reduces their 
investment efficiency (Firth et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009). In this sense we conjecture that 
dual holding reduces the monitoring of firm investment, which results in less efficient 
investment for SOEs because dual holding increases the chance of collusion between banks’ 
and firms’ managers, who tend in this situation to pursue empire building rather than 
maximize value. Therefore, we expect that the marginal costs of this dual holding dominate 
the marginal benefits in SOEs, which distorts banks' lending decisions and investment 
efficiencies. Although the borrowers’ inefficient investment may eventually reduce the equity 
claims from the dual holders, who suffer further deterioration in their lending efficiency and 
increases in their bad debt level, bank managers will not change the corrupt behaviour of their 
suboptimal lending decisions because they tend to maximize their private benefit while they 
do not (fully) account for banks’ losses from their lending.   
However, non-SOE listed firms have evolved since 2001 and are now comparable in 
many ways to their counterparts in developed economies, where value maximization is the 
dominating objective (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011). In particular, the property rights 
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of non-SOEs in China are naturally personal or family-based, which is similar to firms in the 
west, resulting in a better aligned principal-agent relationship. Therefore, the controlling 
shareholders, who are endowed with better monitoring capabilities, are able to prevent 
managers from colluding with bank managers through their effective monitoring. Moreover, 
as banks are more likely to allocate capital to financially healthier non-SOEs using 
commercial judgments (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013), and as dual holders are better 
informed and have access to more inside information, which can help banks to evaluate these 
non-SOEs more accurately, we expect that banks' dual holding leads to optimal lending 
decisions towards non-SOEs. In addition, since dual holding may effectively alleviate agency 
problems between creditors and borrowers (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Jiang et al., 2010), 
the dual holder of a non-SOE is likely to extend monitoring on investment decisions to 
safeguard its own interest of liability quality, because the potential collusion between banks’ 
and firms’ managers is averted. This in turn results in more efficient investment of capital for 
non-SOEs. Thus, the marginal benefits of dual holding prevail among non-SOEs, which may 
lead to optimal bank lending decisions and efficient investment. Therefore, we have the 
following hypotheses: 
H2a: Dual holding distorts banks' lending decisions for SOEs, while it improves banks' 
lending decisions for non-SOEs. 
H2b: Dual holding reduces investment efficiency for SOEs while it enhances investment 
efficiency for non-SOEs.  
To extend our collusion story by providing direct evidence on how the potential 
collusion between managers of firms and banks is averted, we further examine how 
ownership structure (ownership concentration and owner type) affects the relationship 
between dual holding, lending decisions and investment efficiencies in non-SOEs. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) show that some degree of ownership concentration enhances firm 
performance because large block shareholders, in a position to harvest a substantial portion of 
the gains from improvement in firm performance or a takeover, have some incentive and 
resources to monitor management decisions. Using the sample of China’s listed firms, Qi et 
al. (2000) find that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of legal-person 
shares. Therefore, we conjecture that the largest shareholders of firms with higher 
concentrated ownership are able to exert monitoring.  
Additionally, there is normally a controlling shareholder for non-SOEs other than the 
state, which can be a family or an institutional or foreign investor. These controlling 
shareholders may monitor managers to avert their collusion with bank managers, as 
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concentrated ownership can reduce managerial opportunism and expropriation (Wei et al., 
2005).  Most non-SOEs are controlled by either a family or an individual, with the remainder 
controlled by foreign, institutional, and collective investors. The literature shows that in 
family-controlled firms, the controlling families are more likely to appoint family members 
or friends as managers, and have a strong incentive to exercise active monitoring of 
management (Wang, 2012). Other studies also find that active monitoring of management can 
be also exercised by institutional shareholders (Almazan et al., 2005; Zeng et al., 2011) and 
foreign investors (Douma et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2006), which is difficult for smaller or less-
informed investors. However, short-termism and the low stake of institutional holding in 
listed firms in China discourage these institutional investors from taking action to effectively 
monitor the management (Chen et al., 2007). Therefore, we conjecture that family and 
foreign investors are more able to exert effective monitoring on the collusion between 
managers of firms and banks, which will lead to optimal lending decisions and more efficient 
investment than in firms with other controlling shareholders. We construct our last hypothesis 
as follows: 
H3: Dual holding in non-SOEs results in optimal lending decisions and efficient 
investment for firms with higher ownership concentration and firms with family investors and 
foreign investors as the controlling shareholders. 
 
3. Sample selection and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample data are obtained from the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research 
database (CSMAR) from 2003 to 2010 for all the listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. We start our sample from 2003 because the new accounting and auditing 
standards were applied in 2002, and we collect a total population of 8,496 firm-year 
observations. Following common practice, we delete the 190 firm-year observations of firms 
from the financial industry and the 373 firm-year observations of firms flagged with ST or 
ST*. We also exclude 227 firm-year observations with missing information on the variables 
that are used in this study. In addition, to be consistent with our theoretical argument, the 
treatment of firms we are interested in should be those where banks are both shareholders and 
creditors. Thus, to ensure the accuracy of our empirical analysis, we further exclude 135 
firm-year observations where the bank is a shareholder of the firm but does not extend credit 
to it. We are left with a sample of 7,571 firm-year observations. Moreover, to reduce the 
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influence of outliers we also winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all continuous variables 
with outliers. Our final sample consists of 992 firms and 7,420 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Banks' dual holding 
We manually collect the information on dual holding by following the steps described 
below. First, from the Corporate Governance database of CSMAR we assemble detailed 
information on the 10 largest shareholders and their ownership holding in the firms. We then 
identify any banks among the top 10. We go through the IPO prospectus of the companies 
with bank shareholders and ensure that commercial banks were among the original sponsors 
and shareholders in the IPO of these listed firms. To remain consistent with Lin et al. (2009) 
and Luo et al. (2011), we exclude bank shareholding obtained from the debt-to-equity swap 
in SOE reform, because these ownerships held by banks had to be relinquished within the two 
years following the reform. Moreover, to ensure the validity of our empirical analysis, we 
apply the term "dual holding" only to firms where banks act as both shareholders and 
creditors. We apply two proxies for dual holding: the first is the dummy variable 
Bankdummy, which is equal to 1 if the firm has a bank dual holder and 0 otherwise; the 
second is Bankshare, which is the percentage of shares held by dual holders. Table 1 
summarises dual holdings in China’s listed firms over our sample by year. The data reveals 
that there are 343 firm-year observations with bank dual holders out of the 7,420 firm-year 
observations. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 show that the total number of firms with a bank as 
a dual holder and the corresponding percentage both decrease over time, from 51 (5.53%) in 
2003 to 38 (4.06%) in 2010. Columns 5 and 6 show the distribution of firms with bank 
shareholders (this includes those with bank dual holders and those with banks only as 
shareholders as well) from 2003 to 2010.  The number and percentage of firms having a bank 
as a shareholder decreases from 84 (9.11%) in 2003 to only 48 (6.13%) in 2010, which is 
similar to the figures reported by previous studies using a similar sample (Lin et al., 2009; 
Luo et al., 2011). However, since firms with a bank as only a shareholder are not related to 
our theoretical discussion of dual holdings, our focus is on those firms with a bank as a dual 
holder rather than only as a shareholder.  
Table 1. Distribution of firms with bank dual holders and firms with banks as shareholders  
Year Total Firms with 
dual holder 
Percentage with 
dual holder 
Firms with bank 
shareholder 
Percentage with bank 
shareholder 
2003 922 51 5.53% 84 9.11% 
2004 926 49 5.29% 77 8.32% 
2005 928 47 5.06% 74 7.97% 
2006 925 40 4.32% 49 5.30% 
2007 927 40 4.32% 49 5.30% 
2008 928 40 4.31% 49 5.28% 
2009 929 38 4.09% 48 5.17% 
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2010 935 38 4.06% 48 5.13% 
Total 7,420 343 4.62% 478 6.45% 
 
3.3 Ownership concentration and owner type 
In order to test our hypothesis that controlling shareholders are able to monitor firm 
managers and prevent them from colluding with bank managers, we apply two proxies for 
ownership structure. One is ownership concentration, defined as the ownership held by the 
largest shareholder for each firm. Another one is ultimate owner type. To ensure that the 
ultimate owner is able to exert effective monitoring effect, we use 10% ownership as the 
cutoff to identify the ultimate owner for each firm of our sample, following La Porta et al. 
(1999). To do so, we track the ultimate owner by searching the information obtained from the 
Shareholder Analysis Database from CSMAR. From this database, we are able to collect the 
names of ultimate owners for each firm, and divide them into four groups: family owner, 
institutional owner, foreign owner and collective owner.  
3.4 Model specification and variable definition 
To examine whether dual holders can bring more bank loans and determine the different 
effects of dual holding on access to bank loans for SOEs and non-SOEs, we develop the 
following equation: 
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where ∆BankLoan is the change in bank loans (i.e. newly granted bank loans) in the current 
year. We apply two measures as proxies for the change in bank loans: ∆Totalloan, defined as 
the change in the ratio of total bank loans to total assets, and ∆Longloan, defined as the 
change in the ratio of long-term bank loans to total assets. Bank is the measurement of banks' 
dual holding. We apply two proxies in the regression respectively: the dummy variable 
Bankdummy, which is equal to 1 if the firm has a bank dual holder, and the variable 
Bankshare, which is the percentage of shares held by a bank dual holder. NSOE is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 for SOEs. ROS is return on sales, which is the proxy 
for firm performance. Q is the value of Tobin’s Q calculated as the ratio of firm market value 
to replacement value, which is used as a proxy for firm investment opportunity (Firth et al., 
2008; Chen et al., 2011). Size is the log of firm total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible 
assets to firm total assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically 
connected. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is the ratio 
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of independent directors to total directors on the boards. Relation is the bank-firm 
relationship, measured as the number of years since the dual holder first extended credit. We 
also include year and industry fixed effects. Following previous studies, we use the one-year 
lag of dual holding, firm performance, and Tobin’s Q in the regression. 
We also estimate the following model to examine whether dual holders make optimal 
lending decisions. In the spirit of the argument in the literature that an optimal lending 
decision is made if a newly granted bank loan is dependent on a firm’s profitability (Bertrand 
et al., 2007; Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we use the sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to a 
firm’s profitability as the proxy for the bank’s lending decision, where strongly positive 
sensitivity indicates an optimal lending decision.  The model is expressed as follows: 
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  In contrast to Equation (1), we include one interaction term between dual holding and 
ROS to test the bank's lending decision. All the other variables are defined as in Equation (1). 
In both Equations (1) and (2), the dependent variable ∆BankLoan is the change in the ratio of 
bank loans to total assets (i.e. newly granted bank loans) in the current year, which is 
censored at 0, and thus we apply the Tobit model to estimate our equations (1) and (2).  
To examine the investment efficiency, we follow the idea of Bushman et al. (2011) that 
investment efficiency is measured as the sensitivity of the change in investment expenditure 
to the change in investment opportunities. This method has also been applied by other studies 
(Zheng and Zhu, 2013).  The model is expressed as follows: 
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where Ln(Iit/Iit-1) is the log of the change in a firm’s investment expenditures in the current 
year. We follow Firth et al. (2008) to measure investment expenditure as the ratio of net 
capital expenditure (capital expenditure minus annual depreciation) to total assets in the 
current year. Prior studies also applied other proxies for investment, which we consider for 
the robustness tests5. RET measures the change in investment opportunities, which equals the 
log of 1 plus industry stock return. Leverage is defined as the proportion of total debt to total 
                                                          
5 These measures include (1) the ratio of change in net fixed assets plus depreciation to total net fixed assets 
(Pindado et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012) and  (2) the ratio of cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, 
and other long-term assets less cash receipts from selling these assets to total assets (Chen et al., 2011). 
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assets. Income is used to measure internal funds available for investments, which is measured 
as the ratio of net income plus depreciation to total assets. We follow prior studies to control 
for the rate of sales growth. In particular, Sale is the net sales scaled by total assets. We also 
include year and industry fixed effects. To remain consistent with the existing literature, we 
use the one-year lag of leverage in the regression, as well as the sales level. Table 2 
summarizes the definitions of all variables used in this study for both univariate and 
multivariate analysis. 
Table 2. Variables and definitions 
Variable  Definitions 
Bankdummy Equals 1 for firm-year observations with bank as a dual holder 
Bankshare Percentage of shares held by a bank dual holder 
Totalloan Total bank loans/Total assets 
∆Totalloan The change in Totalloan in current year 
Longloan Long-term bank loans/Total assets 
∆Longloan The change in Longloan in current year 
Investment (I) (Capital expenditure-depreciation)/Total assets 
Ln(I it/I it-1) Log of the growth of investment expenditure in current year 
RET Log of 1 plus industry stock return 
ROA Net income/Total assets 
ROS Net income/Sales 
Leverage Total debt/Total assets 
Income Net income + depreciation/Total assets 
Q Tobin’s Q measured as Market value/Replacement value 
Size Log of total assets 
Sale Sales/Total assets 
Tangibility Tangible assets/Total assets 
Board Number of total directors on the boards 
Indep Number of independent directors/Total number of directors on board 
Largest Ownership of the largest shareholder for each firm 
Political 
Relation 
Equals 1 for firms with politically connected executives or large shareholders 
Log of the number of years since the dual holder first extended credit 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for dual holding, change in total bank loans, 
change in long-term bank loans, investment growth, and change in investment opportunity 
(RET).  The average changes in total bank loans and long-term bank loans are 0.07% and 
0.36%, respectively. We also observe that the means of the log of change in investment 
expenditures and investment opportunities are 0.05 and 8.22, which are similar to those 
reported by Zheng and Zhu (2013). We also summarize the firm-level total bank loan, long-
term bank loan, investment expenditure, and firm characteristics. As Table 3 shows, we find 
that 4.62% of total firm-year observations have banks as both shareholders and creditors, and 
the average ownership of dual holders is 0.10%, with a maximum of 10.17%. We also present 
the ratios of the average total bank loans and long-term bank loans as 22.88% and 6.77%, 
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respectively, over our sample, which is similar to the 22.3% reported by Firth et al. (2008). 
The mean (median) of the ratio of net investment to total assets is 27.01% (15.02%), which is 
close to the 34.1% (14.8%) reported by Firth et al. (2008). The sample average Tobin’s Q is 
1.58 and the median value is 1.23, and the average internal cash flow ratio is 5.05%, which is 
similar to the results reported by Pindado et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2011).  
Table 3. Summary statistics  
 Mean Median Min Lower quartile Higher quartile Max Obs 
Bankdummy (%) 4.62 0 0 0 0 100 7420 
Bankshare (%) 0.10 0 0 0 0 10.17 7420 
Totalloan (%) 22.88 22.5 0 11.10 33.39 94.72 7420 
∆Totalloan (%) 0.07 0 -48.70 -3.82 4.82 68.75 7420 
Longloan (%) 6.77 2.58 0 0 9.87 66.46 7420 
∆Longloan (%) 0.36 0 -33.85 -1.44 1.36 53.85 7420 
Investment (%) 27.01 15.02 -28.45 6.39 28.27 266.42 7420 
Ln(I it/I it-1) 0.05 0.04 -3.17 -0.61 0.55 6.52 7420 
RET 8.22 5.25 -81.69 -10.64 48.33 75.71 7420 
ROA (%) 2.81 2.77 -48.48 0.87 5.42 46.31 7420 
ROS (%) 5.43 4.34 -29.61 1.46 9.85 69.39 7420 
Leverage (%) 51.09 51.97 0.02 38.55 63.95 89.36 7420 
Income (%) 5.05 5.13 -8.15 2.98 8.25 11.47 7420 
Tobin’s Q 1.58 1.23 0.50 1.03 1.75 14.91 7420 
Size (million) 4,530 2,260 302 1,200 4,630 64,400 7420 
Sale (%) 72.48 58.60 0.95 36.24 89.30 100.03 7420 
Tangibility (%) 30.03 27.22 0.20 16.05 42.51 95.91 7420 
Board 8.73 9 1 7 10 20 7420 
Indep (%) 0.41 0.36 0 0.33 0.5 0.75 7420 
Largest (%) 47.89 40.77 1.73 27.06 58.33 85.23 7420 
Political 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 7420 
Relation 7.06 7 0 3 11 17 7420 
This table provides summary statistics of our sample for all variables in the empirical analysis. These variables 
are defined in Table 2. 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
4.2.1 Univariate tests 
To provide some empirical evidence to support our hypotheses, we conduct univariate 
tests by comparing the mean of our key variables, including the change in total bank loans 
and change in long-term bank loans, investment growth, and change in investment 
opportunities, as well as firm performance for firms with and without dual holding (Table 4). 
Our tests cover the full sample as well as the SOE and non-SOE subsamples. For the full 
sample we find that dual holding facilitates capital flows and the average changes in total 
bank-loan ratio and long-term bank-loan ratio are 0.34% and 0.38%, respectively, for firms 
with dual holding, which are significantly higher than -0.08% and 0.18%, respectively, for 
firms without dual holding. We further find that firms with a dual holder exhibit significantly 
higher average growth in investment expenditures (5.20% versus -2.18%), but lower mean in 
change in investment opportunities (as measured by RET) than firms without a dual holder 
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(7.49 versus 8.27). For both SOE and non-SOE subsamples, the average changes in bank-
loan ratio, long-term bank-loan ratio and investment growth are significantly higher for firms 
with dual holding, which is consistent with the evidence from the full sample tests. Some 
interesting evidence evolves when we turn to other variables. For the SOE subsample we find 
that the change in investment opportunities (RET) is significantly lower for firms with dual 
holding than for firms without dual holding. As for the non-SOE subsample, we present that 
firms with dual holdings have a higher change in investment opportunities (RET) than firms 
without dual holdings.   
Table 4. Univariate tests 
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 With Without t-value With Without t-value With Without t-value 
∆Totalloan 
(%) 
0.34 -0.08 0.42** 
(2.11) 
0.29 0.02 0.27** 
(2.13) 
0.40 -0.10 0.50** 
(2.41) 
∆Longloan 
(%) 
0.38 0.18 0.20*** 
(2.68) 
0.41 0.27 0.14** 
(2.29) 
0.32 0.10 0.22*** 
(2.69) 
Ln(I it/I it-1) 5.20 -2.18 7.38*** 
(3.18) 
6.47 1.84 4.63* 
(1.87) 
4.65 -3.11 7.76** 
(2.55) 
RET 7.49 8.27 -0.78** 
(-2.46) 
6.82 8.16 -1.34*** 
(-2.76) 
8.83 8.36 0.47* 
(1.93) 
ROA (%) 2.00 2.70 -0.70* 
(-1.93) 
1.96 2.90 -0.94** 
(-2.33) 
2.20 1.46 0.74** 
(1.96) 
ROS (%) 4.12 5.55 -1.43** 
(-2.01) 
3.98 5.73 -1.75** 
(-2.12) 
5.95 5.10 0.85* 
(1.90) 
This table summarizes the univariate tests of our key variables between firms with and without dual holding for 
SOEs and non-SOEs. These variables are defined as in previous tables. 
 
In addition to the differences in the change in bank loans, investment growth and change 
in investment opportunities, there are also significant differences in accounting-based firm 
performance (ROA and ROS). In particular, firm performance is significantly lower in firms 
with dual holding for the full sample and SOE subsample, but is significantly higher in firms 
with dual holding for the non-SOE subsample. For example, for the full sample the ROA is 
2.00% for firms with dual holding, which is significantly lower than 2.70% for firms without 
dual holding (t-value is -1.93). For the SOE subsample, the average ROA is 1.96% for firms 
with dual holding, which is significantly lower than 2.90% (t-value is -2.33) for firms without 
dual holding, while for the non-SOE subsample, this situation is reversed: the average ROA 
is 2.20% for firms with dual holding, which is significantly higher than 1.46% (t-value is 
1.96) for firms without dual holding.  
 
4.2.2 Dual holding and newly granted bank loans  
In this section we conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the effect of dual holding 
on newly granted bank loans to firms by estimating our equation (1). Across columns 1 and 2, 
dual holding is significantly and positively related to the change in total bank-loan ratios. For 
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example, in column 1 where the dependent variable is the change in total bank-loan ratio, the 
estimated coefficient on Bankdummy is 0.05, significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.45), 
indicating that dual holding facilitates firms' access to more newly granted bank loans. To test 
the effect of dual holding in non-SOEs compared to SOEs, we focus on the interaction terms 
between dual holding and the NSOE dummy. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we find that the 
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are all positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that dual holding gives firms easier access to bank loans, and that this effect is 
more significant in non-SOEs than SOEs.  
Table 5. The effect of dual holding on newly granted bank loans  
Dependent variable ∆Totalloan ∆Longloan 
Bankdummy 0.05** 
(2.45) 
 0.07*** 
(2.90) 
 
Bankdummy*NSOE 0.01** 
(1.99) 
 0.01** 
(2.09) 
 
Bankshare  0.04** 
(2.55) 
 0.03* 
(1.92) 
Bankshare*NSOE  0.05*** 
(2.58) 
 0.02** 
(2.07) 
NSOE -0.05* 
(-1.95) 
-0.05** 
(-1.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
ROS 0.05*** 
(5.12) 
0.05*** 
(5.10) 
0.04*** 
(2.58) 
0.04*** 
(2.59) 
Q 0.02* 
(1.71) 
0.01* 
(1.75) 
0.02** 
(2.13) 
0.02** 
(2.15) 
Size 0.06** 
(5.37) 
0.06** 
(5.34) 
0.02*** 
(3.52) 
0.02*** 
(3.55) 
Tangibility 0.02** 
(2.03) 
0.02** 
(2.01) 
0.01*** 
(2.28) 
0.01** 
(2.27) 
Political 0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
Board -0.01 
(-1.15) 
-0.01 
(-1.18) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
Indep -0.02 
(-1.23) 
-0.01 
(-1.19) 
0.01 
(1.25) 
0.01 
(1.25) 
Bankloan -0.15*** 
(-5.81) 
-0.15*** 
(-5.79) 
-0.05*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.62) 
Relation 0.00 
(1.40) 
0.00 
(1.39) 
0.01** 
(2.00) 
0.01** 
(1.99) 
Constant -0.12*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.12*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.03** 
(-2.06) 
-0.03** 
(-2.05) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.35 0.13 0.15 
Observations 7420 7420 7420 7420 
The dependent variables are the change in the ratio of total bank loans to total assets and the change in the ratio 
of long-term bank loans to total assets. Bankdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank dual 
holder and 0 otherwise. Bankshare is the percentage of shares held by a bank dual holder. NSOE is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 for SOEs. ROS is the return on sales. Q is the ratio of firm market value 
to replacement value. Size is the log of firm's total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of firm’s tangible assets to total 
assets. Political is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected. Board is the log of the 
number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of independent directors to total directors on the board. 
Bankloan is the bank-loan ratio of the previous year. Relation is the log of years since the firm was first granted 
loans from the dual holder. 
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The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
In columns 3 and 4, we use the change in the ratio of long-term bank loans to total assets 
as the dependent variable to examine whether dual holding leads to more newly granted long-
term bank loans. The results in columns 3 and 4 show that dual holding is positively related 
to the change in long-term bank loans, although it is marginally significant for the model of 
Bankshare (significant at the 10% level). This suggests that having a dual holder can reduce 
the conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between banks and firms, which results in 
lower monitoring costs and a greater propensity towards long-term bank loans. We also check 
the significance of coefficients on interaction terms to conclude that dual holding is more 
significant for banks granting new long-term loans to non-SOEs. All of these results help to 
support our hypothesis H1 that dual holding can alleviate conflicts of interest and information 
asymmetry between shareholders and creditors, which may lead to easier access to more 
(long-term) bank loans, especially for non-SOEs.   
4.2.3 Dual holding and banks' lending decisions 
In this section we conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the effect of dual holding 
on banks' lending decisions by estimating our Equation (2) for the full sample, and for the 
SOE and non-SOE subsamples (Table 6).  The presence of a dual holder or higher equity 
holding by creditors is positively and significantly associated with newly granted bank loans 
for non-SOEs, while it only matters marginally for SOEs. In the spirit of previous studies 
(Zheng and Zhu, 2013), we apply the sensitivity of newly granted bank loans to firm 
profitability as an indication of whether banks make optimal lending decisions, and a strong 
sensitivity between the newly granted bank loan and firm profitability suggests an optimal 
lending decision. We observe that firm profitability measured by ROS has a strong positive 
and significant relation with newly granted bank loans across all specifications, which 
indicates that firm profitability effectively determines the amount of newly granted bank 
loans. This result is consistent with those obtained by previous studies that banks tend to 
allocate loans to profitable firms using their commercial judgments (Cull and Xu, 2005; Firth 
et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013). 
Table 6. Effect of dual holding on bank lending decisions 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Bankdummy 0.04* 
(1.95) 
 0.03* 
(1.78) 
 0.07*** 
(2.64) 
 
Bankdummy*ROS -0.06 
(-1.36) 
 -0.10* 
(-1.84) 
 0.06** 
(2.33) 
 
Bankshare  0.06**  0.04*  0.08** 
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(2.40) (1.64) (2.27) 
Bankshare*ROS  -0.02 
(-1.01) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.25) 
 0.02*** 
(2.87) 
ROS 0.05*** 
(4.56) 
0.05*** 
(4.51) 
0.05*** 
(4.13) 
0.05*** 
(3.91) 
0.04** 
(2.23) 
0.04** 
(2.38) 
Q 0.02* 
(1.90) 
0.02* 
(1.88) 
0.03* 
(1.87) 
0.02* 
(1.79) 
0.02** 
(2.40) 
0.01** 
(2.39) 
Size 0.03*** 
(3.09) 
0.03*** 
(3.14) 
0.03*** 
(2.67) 
0.03*** 
(2.72) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
0.02 
(0.57) 
Tangibility 0.02** 
(2.42) 
0.08** 
(2.38) 
0.02* 
(1.78) 
0.02* 
(1.78) 
0.02 
(1.53) 
0.02 
(1.47) 
Political 0.01 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
Board -0.01 
(-1.23) 
-0.01 
(-1.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
-0.01 
(-0.60) 
-0.02 
(-1.60) 
-0.02 
(-1.62) 
Indep -0.01 
(-1.31) 
-0.02 
(-1.26) 
-0.02 
(-0.67) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
-0.04 
(-1.53) 
-0.02 
(-1.49) 
Bankloan -0.15*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.15*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.15*** 
(-4.59) 
-0.15*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.21) 
Relation 0.01* 
(1.90) 
0.01* 
(1.84) 
0.01 
(1.00) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
0.01* 
(1.91) 
0.01** 
(1.96) 
Constant -0.06** 
(-2.39) 
-0.06** 
(-2.46) 
-0.07** 
(-2.35) 
-0.07** 
(-2.41) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.25 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of total bank loans to total assets. Bankdummy is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank dual holder and 0 otherwise. Bankshare is the percentage of shares held 
by a bank dual holder. ROS is the return on sales. Q is the ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size 
is the log of firm total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected. Board is the log of number of total directors on the board. 
Indep is the ratio of independent directors to total directors on the board. Bankloan is the bank-loan ratio of the 
previous year. Relation is the log of years since the firm was first granted loans from the dual holder. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
When we turn to interaction terms between dual holding and ROS, more evidence 
emerges. These interaction terms allow us to examine how the presence of dual holding 
affects bank lending decisions for both SOEs and non-SOEs. For the full sample, the 
estimated coefficients on both Bankdummy*ROS and Bankshare*ROS are negative, 
suggesting that dual holding may distort banks' lending decisions. However, when the full 
sample is divided into SOE and non-SOE subsamples, we find that the attenuating effect of 
dual holding on banks' lending decisions only exists for SOEs, while the estimated 
coefficients on interaction terms for non-SOEs turn out to be positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that unlike for SOEs, dual holding can help financially healthier 
non-SOEs to get more bank loans, which indicates optimal lending decisions for non-SOEs. 
These results lend support to our hypothesis H2a that dual holding results in more effective 
monitoring for non-SOEs than SOEs. For example, in column 6 for non-SOEs, the estimated 
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coefficients on Bankdummy*ROS and ROS are 0.06 and 0.04, respectively, both statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that dual holding results in optimal lending decisions 
to non-SOEs. Overall, our findings from Table 6 suggest that banks exercise less monitoring 
and less-optimal lending decisions for SOEs, while dual holding is effective in banks’ 
monitoring and their lending decisions for non-SOEs. Among the control variables, we find 
that political connection facilitates a firm’s access to new bank loans, though the estimated 
coefficients are insignificant. We also observe that a long-term bank-firm relationship 
(measured by the log of number of years since the dual holder first extended loans to firms) 
helps non-SOEs obtain more new bank loans, while this effect is insignificant for SOEs.  
Replacing ROS with ROA (return on assets) in the regression gives similar results.  
4.2.4 Dual holding and firm investment efficiency 
In the following section we estimate Equation (3) to conduct a multivariate analysis to 
examine the effect of dual holding on investment efficiency.  
Table 7 shows the results of the regression of the effect of dual holding on firms' 
investment efficiency, measured as the sensitivity of the investment growth to the change in 
investment opportunities for the full sample, as well as the SOE and non-SOE subsamples.  
The estimated coefficients on RET are significantly positive for the full sample as well as 
both subsamples, indicating that investment is efficient: firm investment growth positively 
responds to the change in investment opportunity. We are more concerned about the 
interaction terms between dual holding and the change in investment opportunities (RET) in 
each regression, and we observe some interesting evidence. For the full sample we observe 
negative coefficients on Bankdummy*RET and Bankshare*RET in both specifications, but 
they are insignificant. For the SOE subsample, the effect of dual holding on investment 
efficiency becomes negative and statistically significant. For non-SOEs, the effect of dual 
holding is positive, indicating that dual holding can enhance investment efficiency for non-
SOEs. For example, in columns 3 and 5, the estimated coefficients on Bankdummy*RET are -
0.02 and 0.02, both significant at the 5% level (t-values are -2.17 and 2.20, respectively). 
Overall, our results support our hypothesis H2b that dual holding distorts firms' investment 
decisions for SOEs, while it improves them for non-SOEs. 
Table 7. Impact of dual holding on investment efficiency 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Bankdummy 0.04** 
(2.16) 
 0.03* 
(1.87) 
 0.07*** 
(2.60) 
 
Bankdummy*RET -0.01 
(-1.04) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.17) 
 0.02** 
(2.20) 
 
Bankshare  0.06*** 
(3.59) 
 0.02* 
(1.67) 
 0.08** 
(2.17) 
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Bankshare*RET  -0.01 
(-0.66) 
 -0.02*** 
(-2.75) 
 0.03** 
(2.21) 
RET 0.05** 
(2.38) 
0.05** 
(2.51) 
0.06** 
(2.25) 
0.06** 
(2.46) 
0.04* 
(1.78) 
0.05* 
(1.85) 
Leverage -0.33*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.33*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.20 
(-1.09) 
-0.19 
(-0.98) 
Income 0.98*** 
(3.91) 
0.98*** 
(3.90) 
1.72*** 
(6.29) 
1.72*** 
(6.29) 
0.41 
(1.51) 
0.40 
(1.46) 
Size 0.04*** 
(3.63) 
0.04*** 
(3.64) 
0.03** 
(2.57) 
0.03** 
(2.55) 
0.05 
(1.48) 
0.05 
(1.55) 
Sale 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.23) 
-0.03 
(-0.20) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Tangibility 0.79*** 
(7.34) 
0.80*** 
(7.72) 
0.74*** 
(9.18) 
0.75*** 
(9.20) 
0.97*** 
(6.42) 
0.91*** 
(6.35) 
Constant -0.67*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.67*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.50** 
(-1.97) 
-0.50* 
(-1.95) 
-0.72 
(-1.12) 
-0.77 
(-1.19) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.32 0.27 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
The dependent variable is the change in investment expenditure. Investment expenditure is defined as the ratio 
of net capital expenditure to total assets. Bankdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank dual 
holder and 0 otherwise. Bankshare is the percentage of shares held by a bank dual holder. RET is measured as 
the log of 1 plus industry stock return. Leverage is the ratio of bank loans to total assets. Income is the ratio of 
internal cash flow to total assets. Size is the log of firm total assets. Sale is the ratio of sales to total assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of firm’s tangible assets to total assets. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
In addition, in all the regressions we find that the coefficients on Leverage are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for the full sample and the SOE subsample 
estimation. For example, in column 1 the coefficient on Leverage is -0.33 and the t-value is  
-3.67. These results are consistent with previous studies that a firm’s leverage is negatively 
related to firm investment expenditures (Lang et al., 1996; Firth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 
2011). Among other control variables, we also find that the estimated coefficients on Income 
are positive and statistically significant in all specifications (except for the non-SOE 
subsample), which is consistent with Pindado et al. (2011), who suggest that funds available 
to firms are positively related to firms' investment decisions. We further find that tangible 
assets are positively and significantly related to investment growth, which echoes the findings 
by Aviazian et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2008). However, we do not find a significant 
relationship between firm sales level and investment growth. Overall, the results of our 
equation are consistent with previous evidence. 
4.2.5 Dual holding and ownership structure in non-SOEs  
In the following section, we conduct a multivariate analysis to examine how ownership 
structure (ownership concentration and owner type) affects the relationship between dual 
holding and non-SOEs' lending decisions and investment efficiencies; the aim is to provide 
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direct evidence of the role of large shareholders in monitoring firm managers by averting 
their collusion with bank managers. First, we consider the effect of ownership concentration.  
We create a dummy variable, Concentration, which is equal to 1 if the ownership 
concentration is higher than the median value and 0 if it is lower.   We include the additional 
interaction terms Bankdummy*ROS*Concentration and Bankdummy*RET*Concentration in 
both lending-decision and investment-efficiency regressions. Moreover, we notice that 
ownership concentration may be endogenously determined, and thus choose two-stage least 
square to address this issue. In the first stage, we follow Wei et al. (2005) that ownership is 
more likely to be concentrated if the firm is operating in a strategic or important industry, and 
choose the strategic or important industry indicator (SID) as the instrumental variable, and 
then regress ownership concentration against  it as well as against control variables. In the 
second stage, we use the predicted value of ownership concentration obtained from the first 
stage.  Panel A of Table 8 gives the results of both stages.  
In addition, we also identify who is the controlling shareholder and examine which type 
of controlling shareholder is more effective in monitoring firm managers and preventing them 
from colluding with bank managers. Among the non-SOEs with more highly concentrated 
ownership, we track the ultimate owner for each firm and identify four types of owner:  
family, institutional, foreign, and collective. Again, we run Equations (2) and (3) for each 
subsample (Panels B and C in Table 8). 
Table 8. Lending decision and investment efficiency for the non-SOE subsample 
Panel A: Effect of ownership concentration on the relationship of banks' dual holding with lending decision and 
investment efficiency 
 First stage Second stage 
 Dependent variable is 
ownership concentration 
Lending-decision 
regression 
Investment-
efficiency regression 
SID 0.16***(2.62)   
Bankdummy  0.07**(2.02) 0.06***(2.77) 
Bankdummy*ROS  0.03*(1.82)  
Bankdummy*ROS*Concentration   0.16*(1.71)  
Bankdummy*RET   0.02(0.76) 
Bankdummy*RET*Concentration   0.04*(1.86) 
Other variables included in the regression are those from the bank lending and investment efficiency equations, 
such as return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent director ratio, political connection, 
lagged loan level, bank-firm relationship, change in investment opportunity, leverage, net income, sales, and 
year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.28 0.33 
Observations 2343 2343 2343 
Panel B: Effect of owner types on the relationship between banks' dual holding and lending decision  
 Family owner Institutional 
owner 
Foreign owner Collective owner 
Bankdummy 0.06** 
(2.15) 
0.02 
(1.59) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(1.20) 
Bankdummy*ROS 0.37** 
(2.02) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
0.23*** 
(3.21) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
Other variables included in the regression are return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent 
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director ratio, political connection, lagged loan level, bank-firm relationship, and year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.07 
Observations 1177 561 358 203 
Panel C: Effect of owner types on the relationship between banks' dual holding and investment efficiency 
Bankdummy 0.09* 
(1.79) 
0.02 
(1.24) 
0.03 
(1.01) 
0.07 
(0.78) 
Bankdummy*RET 0.06* 
(1.67) 
0.08 
(1.36) 
0.05*** 
(5.29) 
-0.45 
(-0.73) 
Other variables included in the regression are change in investment opportunities, firm size, tangible assets, 
leverage, board size, independent director ratio, net income, sales, and year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.33 0.69 0.30 
Observations 1177 561 358 203 
This table reports the additional test results for the non-SOE subsample. Panel A reports the ownership 
concentration effect on the relationship of banks' dual holding with lending decision and investment efficiency 
using two-stage least square methods. Panels B and C report the results for those with different controlling 
shareholders.  
 
As  shown in Panel A in Table 8, our previous conclusion that dual holding  can improve 
lending decisions and enhance investment efficiency still holds, as reflected by the 
significantly positive coefficients on Bankdummy*ROS and Bankdummy*RET in the second 
stage. More importantly, we observe that the effect of banks' dual holding is more significant 
for non-SOEs with higher concentrated ownership. These results suggest that in non-SOEs, 
higher ownership concentration can exert effective monitoring on potential collusion between 
firm managers and bank managers; this monitoring will lead to optimal lending decisions and 
more efficient investment. Within the subsample of non-SOEs with higher concentrated 
ownership, we further run regressions for groups of firms with each type of controlling 
shareholder that we have identified, and we observe that our previous conclusions hold for 
firms where families or foreign investors are the ultimate owners. In other words, controlling 
families and foreign investors are more able to exert monitoring effects than institutional 
shareholders and collective shareholders as controlling shareholders, which supports our 
hypothesis H3.  
4.3 Additional analysis: Bank loan contract evidence 
In the above analysis, we focus on the change in the aggregate bank loans (Bankloan) 
each year at the firm level. Bankloan measures the total amount of loans borrowed from all 
financial institutions including the dual holders. One potential drawback of this firm-level 
approach is that it does not show the exact amount of loans borrowed from the dual holders. 
Lacking information may lead to identification problems because the dual holders may not 
necessarily have sufficient incentives to monitor the loans lent by other financial institutions. 
In this section, to provide direct evidence of the effect of dual holding on bank loan granting, 
we focus specifically on newly granted bank loans to each firm from a dual holder by 
conducting multivariate analysis at the bank loan level. The purpose of this analysis is to 
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explicitly identify the bank loan awarded by the dual holder, and examine whether dual 
holding facilitates more credit from dual holders and determine its effects on bank lending 
decisions.  
To do so, we apply the bank loan dataset from the CSMAR to provide additional 
evidence regarding a bank’s lending decision and try to relate dual holding to the specific 
newly granted bank loans by the dual holder. From the bank loan dataset of the CSMAR 
database, we collect 2,040 new bank loan announcements within our sample from 2003 to 
2010. We are also able to obtain detailed information on lending terms for each loan, 
including loan amount, interest rate, loan maturity, lending bank, whether the loan is 
guaranteed by a third party, and so on. We delete 54 observations with missing information 
on the loan amounts, and finally have 1,986 observations. Thus, for the multivariate analysis, 
we conduct a bank loan level regression by regressing the ratio of newly granted bank loans 
to firm assets of the previous year against dual holding and a set of control variables. 
Moreover, we replace Bankdummy with a new dummy variable, Newdummy, equal to 1 if the 
firm with dual holding obtains new bank loans from the dual holder and 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with our Newdummy variable, we also have Newshare, defined as the shareholding 
of the dual holder where the Newdummy is equal to 1. The results are reported in Table 9. The 
estimated coefficients on our key variables are broadly similar to those reported in Table 6. 
The empirical results suggest that dual holders would like to extend more credit to firms 
where they hold equity ownership on average, represented by the significantly positive 
coefficients on Newdummy and Newshare across six specifications (except for the 
specification in column 3). The interaction terms also show consistent sign and significance 
with those in Table 6 (except for the specification in column 3). For example, in columns 5 
and 6 for non-SOEs, the positive coefficients on interaction terms suggest that a new bank 
loan granted from a dual holder is dependent on a firm’s profitability for non-SOEs, while the 
negative coefficients suggest that the lending decision is distorted for SOEs with dual 
holding. Overall, compared with the results from Table 6, our main findings are still valid 
using bank loan level data. 
Table 9. Dual holding and newly granted bank loan 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Newdummy 0.29** 
(2.10) 
 0.03 
(1.45) 
 0.41** 
(2.30) 
 
Newdummy*ROS -0.23 
(-1.14) 
 -0.43 
(-1.31) 
 0.03** 
(2.04) 
 
Newshare  0.01** 
(2.36) 
 0.01** 
(2.02) 
 0.46** 
(2.50) 
Newshare*ROS  -0.01 
(-0.94) 
 -0.09** 
(-2.55) 
 0.06*** 
(2.81) 
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ROS 0.08** 
(2.33) 
0.10** 
(1.97) 
0.02** 
(2.29) 
0.06** 
(2.30) 
0.10** 
(2.48) 
0.14** 
(2.35) 
Control variables include firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent director ratio, political connection, 
and year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.46 0.15 0.33 0.20 0.62 
Observations 1986 1986 1239 1215 747 747 
This table reports the results of using single bank loan data, and the regression above is conducted at the bank-
loan level. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.4 Robustness tests for the endogeneity issue 
As we explained before, commercial banks were initially encouraged to participate in the 
sponsorship and underwriting business of the IPO of large SOEs, but since 1995, according to 
the Commercial Bank Law (revised in 2003), have been prohibited from holding new 
ownership in non-financial companies. This indicates that banks’ shareholding could not be 
increased, but that dual holders can still relinquish their original equity position due to 
observable and non-observable factors, so in this sense dual holding still suffers from an 
endogeneity issue. Therefore, in the following sections, we try to address this endogeneity 
issue by applying the event-study method, natural experiment, two-stage least square and 
fixed-effect regression.   
4.4.1 Event-study method: Market reaction to the announcements of new bank loans 
and mergers and acquisitions 
The basic assumption of using the event-study method is that the event is purely 
exogenous, and thus the method avoids endogeneity concerns (Bhagat and Romano, 2007; 
Fan et al., 2008). In the spirit of Zheng and Zhu (2013), we choose the announcements of 
bank loans and mergers and acquisitions as exogenous events and examine lending decisions 
and investment efficiencies by focusing on how investors evaluate these announcements. 
Specifically, the announcement effect is measured by the market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcements using the market-adjusted excess return 
model. We choose three days in the event window (-1, +1), and 230 days as the estimation 
window (-240, -10). Our CAR calculation is consistent with the method applied by Huang et 
al. (2012). 
In the previous section, we examined the effect of dual holding on banks' lending 
decisions from the firm’s perspective. In this section, we examine the effect of dual holding 
on lending decisions from the perspective of outside investors. In particular, we examine 
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whether dual holding affects bank lending decisions reflected in the market reaction to bank 
loan announcements.  
Following the same sample of bank loans used in Table 9, we calculate the three-day 
CAR around each bank loan announcement and obtain 1,997 three-day CARs observations. 
Empirically, we estimate the regression by replacing the dependent variables in Table 9 with 
the three-day CAR around bank loan announcements (Table 10). The estimated coefficients 
of our key variables are reported in the table. The empirical results suggest that in the 
investors’ opinion, the bank loans granted to SOEs with dual holding are of low efficiency, 
while banks make efficient lending decisions to non-SOEs with dual holding.  
Table 10. The effect of dual holding on market reactions to bank loan announcements 
Dependent variable: Three-day CARs around bank loan announcements 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Bankdummy -0.02 
(-1.17) 
 -0.09 
(-1.48) 
 0.06** 
(2.45) 
 
Bankshare  -0.01 
(-1.14) 
 -0.02* 
(-1.85) 
 0.02** 
(2.04) 
Control variables include return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, board size, independent director ratio, 
political connection, lagged loan level, bank-firm relationship, and year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.19 
Observations 1997 1997 1250 1250 747 747 
This table reports the market reaction to bank loan announcements. The dependent variable is the three-day 
CAR around bank loan announcements. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 We also examine the effect of a bank's dual holding on investment efficiency from the 
investors’ perspective. In particular, we examine the market reaction to announcements of 
mergers and acquisitions. The purpose is to see whether the market reacts to M&A 
announcements in such a way that banks' dual holding distorts lending decisions and reduces 
investment efficiency for SOEs, while improving lending decisions and enhancing 
investment efficiency for non-SOEs. 
We obtain the sample of M&A announcements and individual daily stock returns from 
the Mergers and Acquisitions and Individual Stock Trading database from the CSMAR 
dataset.  We obtain 17,847 M&A events between 2003 and 2010. We apply the three-day 
market-adjusted CAR around M&A announcements as the dependent variable; Table 11 
presents the regression results of dual holding on market reaction to M&A announcements. 
The estimated coefficients on our key variables, namely the measurements of dual holding, 
are negative for the full sample and SOE subsample, and only significant for Bankshare in 
the SOE subsample; in contrast, they become positive and significant for the non-SOE 
subsample. The empirical results suggest that investors would regard dual holding-related 
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investment expenditure as less efficient or inefficient on average. This view from the 
investor’s perspective becomes more significant for SOEs. However, investors view the dual 
holding-related investment expenditure as more efficient for non-SOEs, as it is connected to 
the increase in investment opportunities more closely than it is for SOEs. Generally, this 
evidence supports our argument that dual holding in SOEs leads to less efficient investment, 
while it enhances the investment efficiency for non-SOEs. 
Table 11. The effect of dual holding on market reaction to M&A announcements 
Dependent variable: Three day CAR around M&A announcements 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Bankdummy -0.09 
(-0.72) 
 -0.16 
(-1.09) 
 0.15** 
(2.09) 
 
Bankshare  -0.10 
(-0.30) 
 -0.28** 
(-2.07) 
 0.17** 
(2.26) 
Control variables include RET, leverage, income, firm size, sales, tangible assets, largest shareholder ownership, 
and year and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 
Observations 17847 17847 11780 11780 6067 6067 
This table reports the results of the effect of dual holding on the market reaction to the announcements of M&A. 
The dependent variable is the three-day CAR around M&A announcements.  
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Natural experiment of a stimulus package 
In this section, we apply an economic stimulus package as a natural experiment to test 
whether our results are robust to the corrections for the endogeneity issue. We argue that an 
economic stimulus package is an exogenous shock on bank loan supply, at least with respect 
to any individual firm, that significantly increases the funds available for firms' investment 
expenditures. Holding dual holdings constant, this shock to the funds available increases the 
expected level of lending and investment expenditures. To provide empirical evidence, we 
repeat our above analysis by adding one dummy variable, Stimulus, which is equal to 1 for 
firm-year observations during the economic stimulus package period between 2009 and 2010 
and 0 during the pre-economic stimulus package period.  
We report the results in Table 12 below (only key variables are reported). In Panel A we 
report the banks' lending decision regression where the dependent variable is the change in 
the ratio of bank loan to total assets.  We observe that estimated coefficients on dual holding 
are positive in all specifications, and statistically significant for the non-SOEs subsample, 
while insignificant for the SOEs subsample. We are more concerned about the interaction 
term between dual holding, ROS and the stimulus package dummy, 
Bankdummy*ROS*Stimulus and Bankshare*ROS*Stimulus. We find a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for this interaction term for SOEs, but a positive 
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coefficient for non-SOEs (only significant for the Bankshare model), which indicates that an 
economic stimulus package further distorts banks' lending decisions to SOEs, while it 
improves lending decisions to non-SOEs.  
In Panel B we report the firm investment efficiency regression, where the dependent 
variable is investment growth.  We find estimated coefficients on dual holding consistent 
with those reported in previous tables. Again, we are more concerned about the interaction 
term between dual holding, the change in investment opportunities and the stimulus package 
dummy. As for the variables of both Bankdummy*RET*Stimulus and 
Bankshare*RET*Stimulus, we find statistically negative coefficients for the SOE subsample, 
and positive coefficients for the non-SOE subsample. For example, in columns 3 and 5 the 
coefficients on Bankdummy*RET*Stimulus are -0.02 and 0.03 for SOEs and non-SOEs, 
respectively, both of which are significant at the 5% level (t-values are -2.25 and 2.06, 
respectively). These results indicate that dual holding weakens the investment efficiency of 
SOEs while enhancing the investment efficiency for non-SOEs, and that these effects are 
reinforced with the introduction of the economic stimulus package. Overall, the results from 
Table 12 are consistent with the results from Tables 6 and 7, which confirms that our results 
are robust after taking the endogeneity issue into account by applying a natural experiment.    
Table 12. Impact of dual holding on lending decisions and investment efficiency: natural experiment 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Panel A: Bank lending decisions regression 
Bankdummy 0.03 
(1.24) 
 0.03 
(0.69) 
 0.04** 
(1.98) 
 
Bankdummy*ROS -0.03 
(-0.29) 
 -0.09 
(-0.42) 
 0.08** 
(2.49) 
 
Bankdummy*ROS*Stimulus -0.02 
(-0.34) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.23) 
 0.14 
(1.38) 
 
Bankshare  0.06 
(1.27) 
 0.03 
(0.75) 
 0.07** 
(2.55) 
Bankshare*ROS  -0.03 
(-1.34) 
 -0.04** 
(-1.99) 
 0.02* 
(1.89) 
Bankshare*ROS*Stimulus  -0.03 
(-1.39) 
 -0.03* 
(-1.92) 
 0.02** 
(2.05) 
Other control variables include Stimulus, ROS, ROS*Stimulus, Bank dual holding and Stimulus interactions, 
firm size, tangible assets, political connection, board size, independent director ratio, lagged loan level, bank-
firm relationship, and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression 
Bankdummy 0.05*** 
(2.71) 
 0.08** 
(2.08) 
 0.04** 
(2.26) 
 
Bankdummy*RET -0.08 
(-0.51) 
 -0.03 
(-0.17) 
 0.09** 
(2.43) 
 
Bankdummy*RET*Stimulus -0.02* 
(-1.71) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.25) 
 0.03** 
(2.06) 
 
Bankshare  0.08*** 
(2.61) 
 0.12** 
(2.40) 
 0.07*** 
(2.59) 
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Bankshare*RET  -0.01 
(-0.39) 
 -0.01** 
(-2.23) 
 0.01** 
(2.37) 
Bankshare*RET*Stimulus  -0.02 
(-1.39) 
 -0.03*** 
(-2.60) 
 0.01** 
(2.40) 
Other control variables include Stimulus, RET, RET*Stimulus, Bank dual holding and Stimulus interactions, 
leverage, income, firm size, sales, tangible assets, and industry fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.27 0.24 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
This table reports the regression results using the natural experiment method to address the endogeneity issue of 
dual holding. Package is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-year observations falling during the post-
economic stimulus package period. All the variables are defined as in previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.4.3 Two-stage least square and firm fixed-effect regression 
In this section, we apply the two-stage least square (2SLS) approach to address the 
endogeneity issue. Following Luo et al. (2011) we choose the number of employees of the 
firm as the instrumental variable of dual holding. In the first stage we regress dual holding 
against the instrumental variable as well as a set of control variables, and in the second stage 
we use the predicted value of dual holding obtained from the first stage as a proxy for dual 
holding in the bank-loan and investment equation. The results of using 2SLS for banks' 
lending decisions and firms' investment efficiencies are reported in Tables 13 and 14, 
respectively. From Panel A in both tables, we observe that number of employees is positively 
and significantly related to dual holding in the first stage. From the results of the second 
stages (Panel B in both tables), we observe a similar sign and significance of estimated 
coefficients of our key variables to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.  
Table 13. 2SLS estimation of bank lending decision regression 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Panel A: First stage, where bank dual holding is the dependent variable 
Employee 0.13** 
(2.49) 
0.02*** 
(2.65) 
0.05** 
(2.50) 
0.02* 
(1.72) 
0.34** 
(2.20) 
0.03** 
(2.09) 
Other variables are also included in the first stage regression: firm size, board size, independent director ratio, 
tangible assets, return on sales, political connection, lagged loan level, bank-firm relationship, and year and 
industry fixed effects.  
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.18 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
Panel B: Second stage, where change in bank loan is the dependent variable 
Bankdummy 0.23*** 
(2.66) 
 0.22** 
(2.17) 
 0.23** 
(2.06) 
 
Bankdummy*ROS -0.16*** 
(-3.49) 
 -0.22*** 
(-2.71) 
 0.18** 
(2.32) 
 
Bankshare  0.15** 
(2.02) 
 0.15* 
(1.65) 
 0.12** 
(2.24) 
Bankshare*ROS  -0.02 
(-0.37) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.30) 
 0.01* 
(1.93) 
Other variables are also included in the second stage regression: return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, board 
size, independent director ratio, political connection, lagged loan level, bank-firm relationship, and year and 
industry fixed effects. 
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Adjusted R2 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.08 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
This table reports both the first- and second-stage regression results of the bank lending decision equation. 
Employee is the log of the number of employees, which is used as the instrument variable of dual holding in the 
first stage. The definitions of other variables are the same as those in previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
   
 
Table 14. 2SLS estimation of firm investment efficiency regression 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Panel A: First stage, where bank dual holding is the dependent variable 
Employee 0.10** 
(2.14) 
0.02** 
(2.04) 
0.02** 
(2.18) 
0.03** 
(2.11) 
0.34** 
(2.31) 
0.01** 
(2.10) 
Other variables are also included in the first stage regression: firm size, board size, independent director ratio, 
tangible assets, leverage, net income, sales, change in investment opportunities, and year and industry fixed 
effects.  
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.63 0.31 0.37 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
Panel B: Second stage, where the log of the investment growth is the dependent variable 
Bankdummy 0.37* 
(1.70) 
 0.07** 
(2.33) 
 0.50** 
(2.27) 
 
Bankdummy*RET -0.32 
(-1.08) 
 -0.57** 
(-2.55) 
 0.37*** 
(2.59) 
 
Bankshare  0.28** 
(2.42) 
 0.19*** 
(2.62) 
 0.34** 
(2.22) 
Bankshare*RET  -0.06 
(-1.63) 
 -0.15** 
(-1.96) 
 0.08* 
(1.81) 
Other variables are also included in the second stage regression: RET, firm size, tangible assets, leverage, board 
size, independent director ratio, net income, sales, change in investment opportunities, and year and industry 
fixed effects. 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.24 0.27 0.32 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
This table reports both the first- and second-stage regression results of the firm investment efficiency equation. 
Employee is the log of the number of employees, which is used as the instrument variable of dual holding in the 
first stage. The definitions of other variables are the same as those in previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Moreover, we also apply the fixed-effect regression to further check the robustness of 
our results. Following the discussion by Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005), and Firth 
et al. (2008), we use the firm fixed-effect panel data regression to mitigate the unobservable 
time-invariant firm effect. The results of using the firm fixed effect are reported in Table 15.  
The results for our key variables are broadly similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
Overall, putting the results of both 2SLS and firm fixed effect regression together, our main 
findings are valid that dual holding improves bank lending and enhances investment 
efficiency for non-SOEs, while the opposite is true for SOEs. 
Table 15. Firm fixed-effect estimation 
 Full sample SOE subsample Non-SOE subsample 
Panel A: Bank lending decision equation 
Bankdummy 0.11*  0.05  0.25*  
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(1.75) (0.72) (1.80) 
Bankdummy*ROS -0.03** 
(-2.40) 
 -0.03** 
(-1.99) 
 0.02** 
(2.08) 
 
Bankshare  0.05** 
(2.27) 
 0.05 
(0.28) 
 0.05** 
(2.16) 
Bankshare*ROS  -0.03** 
(-2.38) 
 -0.03** 
(-1.99) 
 0.02* 
(1.92) 
Other variables included in this regression include: return on sales, firm size, tangible assets, board size, 
independent director ratio, political connection, lagged loan level, and bank-firm relationship. 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.07 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency equation 
Bankdummy 0.03** 
(2.11) 
 0.04* 
(1.74) 
 0.03** 
(2.43) 
 
Bankdummy*RET -0.02 
(-1.13) 
 0.02* 
(1.88) 
 0.03** 
(2.07) 
 
Bankshare  0.26** 
(2.02) 
 0.39* 
(1.86) 
 0.10** 
(2.07) 
Bankshare*RET  -0.02* 
(-1.75) 
 -0.03* 
(-1.85) 
 0.01** 
(2.10) 
Other variables included in this regression include: firm size, tangible assets, leverage, board size, independent 
director ratio, net income, sales, and change in investment opportunities. 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.08 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
This table reports the firm fixed effect of determinants of the change in bank loans and investment growth for 
the full sample, SOE sub-sample, and non-SOE sub-sample. The definitions of all variables are the same as 
those in previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
4.5 Further analysis: Dual holding and firm performance 
Our findings suggest that dual holding affects banks' lending decisions and firms' 
investment behaviour differently in SOEs and non-SOEs. Because this study has proposed  
that dual holders’ lending decisions affect firms' investment policies, and it is the mechanism 
through which dual holding affects firm performance, it has been interesting to explore 
whether dual holding influences firm performance in the same way as it influences lending 
and investment. To test our additional hypothesis we conduct the following equation: 
itit
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where Performance is the measure of firm performance. We apply return on assets (ROA) as 
a proxy for firm performance. All the other variables are defined as in previous tables. The 
regression results are reported in Table 16. We assume that firm investment is determined by 
a set of variables that are also included in Equation (3); thus our regression suffers from an 
endogenous issue. To address this issue we apply the 2SLS method and choose the regional 
index as the instrumental variable, following Fan et al. (2011). In the first stage we regress 
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firm investment expenditures against the regional index and a set of control variables. In the 
second stage the value of investment is the predicted value obtained from the first stage. We 
report the results for the first and second stages in Table 16.    
 In Panel A, we find that the regional index is positively related to firm investment 
expenditures, which indicates that the average investment level of a firm is significantly 
higher in the area with better development. In Panel B we find evidence supporting our 
hypothesis that dual holding affects firm performance through investment policy differently 
in SOEs and non-SOEs. For the full sample we find that both dual holding and the interaction 
term between dual holding and investment are negatively related to firm performance, which 
is consistent with the previous evidence in emerging markets (Fok et al., 2004; Lin et al., 
2009). However, we are curious about the dual holding effect on firm performance, so we 
rerun the regression for both SOE and non-SOE subsamples respectively and report the 
results in columns 3 to 6. In particular, we observe that dual holding has a negative effect on 
firm performance for SOEs. When we combine the net effect of Bankdummy*PInvestment 
and PInvestment, we find that investment is negatively related to firm performance for SOEs. 
For example, in column 3 the estimated coefficients on Bankdummy*PInvestment and 
PInvestment are -0.31 and 0.26, significant at the 5% and 10% levels (t-values are -2.49 and 
1.94), and the net effect is negative (-0.31+0.26=-0.05), whereas the opposite effect occurs in 
the non-SOE subsample. For instance, in column 5 the estimated coefficients on 
Bankdummy*PInvestment and PInvestment are 0.10 and 0.17, both of which are significant at 
the 5% level (t-values are 2.33 and 2.03), and the net effect is positive (0.10+0.17=0.27), 
indicating that investment is positively related to firm performance for non-SOEs. 
Furthermore, a similar effect occurs when we apply the percentage of shares held by bank 
shareholders as the measure of dual holding. Among the control variables, we find that 
ownership of the largest shareholder is positively associated with firm performance, which is 
consistent with the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). The positive relationship in 
SOEs seems to be in contrast to previous evidence from China. This may be because we use 
the total equity shares held by the largest shareholders, rather than only the legal-person 
shares held by the largest shareholders, as in previous studies (Qi et al., 2000). In general, our 
results suggest that dual holding has a negative effect on firm performance in SOEs and a 
positive effect on firm performance in non-SOEs. As a robustness check, we rerun our 
Equation (4) with different proxies for firm performance, including return on sales (ROS) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q), and find similar results to those in Table 16. Overall, our study suggests that 
dual holding helps SOEs obtain easier access to bank loans but does not exert enough 
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monitoring over their loans or how they are used. However, in non-SOEs dual holding is 
more likely to exercise monitoring functions, which improves firm performance. We argue 
that whether dual holding is positively related to firm performance depends on a firm's 
investment policy. 
Table 16. The effect of dual holding on firm performance: 2SLS method 
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
Panel A: The results for the first stage, where dependent variable is investment expenditures 
Bankdummy 0.04** 
(2.29) 
 0.02* 
(1.95) 
 0.08** 
(2.69) 
 
Bankshare  0.10* 
(1.95) 
 0.07 
(1.11) 
 0.14** 
(1.96) 
Q 0.07* 
(1.91) 
0.06* 
(1.90) 
0.05* 
(1.75) 
0.05* 
(1.73) 
0.10*** 
(2.58) 
0.10*** 
(2.57) 
Leverage -0.12*** 
(-2.22) 
-0.10** 
(-2.19) 
-0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.04 
(-0.15) 
-0.52** 
(-2.29) 
-0.53** 
(-2.30) 
Income 0.06 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(1.15) 
0.40 
(1.20) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
Size 0.09 
(1.51) 
0.08 
(1.48) 
0.09*** 
(2.69) 
0.09*** 
(2.68) 
0.07 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(0.35) 
Sale -0.10** 
(-1.97) 
-0.11** 
(-2.07) 
-0.12** 
(-2.21) 
-0.12** 
(-2.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.04) 
-0.02 
(--0.04) 
Tangibility 0.35** 
(1.99) 
0.35** 
(2.01) 
0.29*** 
(3.08) 
0.29*** 
(3.08) 
0.39* 
(1.71) 
0.38* 
(1.70) 
Largest -0.02 
(-1.35) 
-0.02 
(-1.38) 
-0.03* 
(-1.76) 
-0.03* 
(-1.77) 
-0.00 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
Board -0.08 
(-0.69) 
-0.09 
(-0.69) 
-0.05 
(-0.56) 
-0.06 
(-0.56) 
-0.09 
(-0.22) 
-0.09 
(-0.22) 
Indep -0.30 
(-1.57) 
-0.29 
(-1.56) 
-0.08 
(-0.49) 
-0.08 
(-0.47) 
-0.60 
(-1.41) 
-0.60 
(-1.41) 
Regional index 0.16*** 
(2.92) 
0.16*** 
(2.90) 
0.26** 
(2.21) 
0.25** 
(2.19) 
0.05** 
(2.06) 
0.05** 
(2.04) 
Constant -0.87 
(-0.59) 
-0.85 
(-0.57) 
-1.09 
(-1.32) 
-1.07 
(-1.30) 
-0.26 
(-0.05) 
-0.28 
(-0.05) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.26 0.29 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
Panel B: The results for the second stage, where dependent variable is firm performance 
Bankdummy -0.02** 
(-2.22) 
 -0.02** 
(-2.29) 
 0.01** 
(2.64) 
 
Bankdummy*PInvestment -0.26** 
(-2.08) 
 -0.31** 
(-2.49) 
 0.10** 
(2.33) 
 
Bankshare  -0.26*** 
(-3.75) 
 -0.27*** 
(-3.44) 
 0.01* 
(1.85) 
Bankshare*PInvestment  -0.28* 
(-1.65) 
 -0.32** 
(-2.09) 
 0.02** 
(2.38) 
PInvestment 0.22*** 
(3.15) 
0.23*** 
(3.30) 
0.26* 
(1.94) 
0.28* 
(1.72) 
0.17** 
(2.03) 
0.17** 
(2.01) 
Size 0.03*** 
(14.49) 
0.02*** 
(14.45) 
0.02*** 
(12.58) 
0.02*** 
(12.56) 
0.03*** 
(8.98) 
0.03*** 
(9.01) 
Leverage -0.20*** 
(-12.47) 
-0.20*** 
(-12.45) 
-0.17*** 
(-11.96) 
-0.17*** 
(-11.74) 
-0.22*** 
(-6.23) 
-0.22*** 
(-6.24) 
Largest 0.02*** 
(4.46) 
0.02*** 
(4.45) 
0.02*** 
(3.29) 
0.02*** 
(3.25) 
0.02** 
(2.11) 
0.02** 
(2.08) 
Board 0.03 
(0.81) 
0.03 
(0.84) 
0.06 
(1.15) 
0.05 
(1.15) 
0.04 
(0.50) 
0.05 
(0.60) 
Indpe 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
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(0.77) (0.82) (0.47) (0.55) (0.34) (0.35) 
Constant -0.37*** 
(-12.46) 
-0.37*** 
(-12.38) 
-0.33*** 
(-10.31) 
-0.32*** 
(-10.19) 
-0.56*** 
(-8.28) 
-0.56*** 
(-8.31) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.42 0.42 
Observations 7420 7420 5077 5077 2343 2343 
This table reports the results of estimating firm performance against dual holding and other control variables. 
Panel A reports the first stage results, where the dependent variable is firm investment. Regional index is the 
index compiled by Fan et al. (2011) as the proxy for regional development. Panel B reports the second stage 
results, where the dependent variable is firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA). PInvestment is 
the predicted value of firm investment obtained from the first stage. Largest is the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder. Board is the log of number of director on the boards. Indep is the percentage of 
independent directors to total number of directors on the boards. All the other variables are defined as in 
previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses, and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, clustered by firm; *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to examine the financial implications of dual holding on 
banks' lending decisions and firms' investment efficiency. We are motivated by the mixed 
evidence that exists about how dual holding affects firm performance, so we dig deeper to 
investigate the mechanism through which dual holding influences firm performance, in order 
to explain why the existing evidence is mixed. We find that the potential collusion between 
managers of banks and firms arising from dual holding affects banks' lending decisions and 
firms' investment policy, which results in the different effects that dual holding has on firm 
performance. We use data from China’s listed firms and find that the presence of banks' dual 
holding results in easier access to bank loans, and in particular long-term bank loans, effects 
that are more pronounced in non-SOEs. Moreover, dual holding distorts banks' lending 
decisions and weakens firms' investment efficiencies for SOEs, while enhancing lending and 
investment efficiencies for non-SOEs. 
Our results also provide evidence to support our hypothesis that in non-SOEs the higher 
ownership concentration of the controlling shareholders is more effective in preventing firms’ 
executives from colluding with bank managers. Our results also show that among all types of 
ultimate owners, family owners and foreign investors are more likely to exert effective 
monitoring than other types of ultimate owners. Further analysis suggests that whether dual 
holding can increase firm performance depends largely on whether investment is efficient, 
which is also influenced by banks' lending decisions. We also provide evidence that the 
economic stimulus package has further distorted economic efficiency in SOEs, with our 
results showing that low bank lending and investment efficiencies in SOEs with dual holding 
are exacerbated by government intervention, an effect that turns out to be positive for non-
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SOEs. Our main findings are robust to corrections for endogeneity of dual holding, including 
using single loan-contracts, event studies of announcements of loan contracts and mergers 
and acquisitions, the natural experiment of the economic stimulus package, and two-stage 
regressions.  
Overall, we find that dual holding enables banks to extend more efficient loans to non-
SOEs based on their commercial judgment, which leads to an efficient investment and adds 
value to non-SOEs. Conversely, dual holding distorts banks' lending decisions and 
investment efficiencies and destroys firm value for SOEs. We argue that in emerging markets 
whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of 
companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between managers of firms and 
banks can be averted; this in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and 
ownership structure.  
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